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DEFINITE AND SUBSTANTIAL RELIANCE:
REMEDYING INJUSTICE UNDER SECTION 90
Gerald Griffin Reidy*
INTRODUCTION
Uncle, aware that Nephew desires to buy a new car but does not
quite have the means, promises' Nephew $1000.2 Uncle promises the
gift of money freely, expecting to receive nothing in return. Nephew,
delighted at the gift, does indeed buy himself a new car. Commenta-
tors would generally agree that if Uncle subsequently refused to
honor his promise, Nephew would have a viable claim against him in
promissory estoppel.3 It is questionable, though, whether the same
would hold true if, under these circumstances, Nephew had reason-
ably relied upon Uncle's promise by performing a concrete act, but
not the specific act that Uncle had expected; if, for example, Nephew
had instead purchased a plane ticket for that long-dreamed-of trip to
Las Vegas in reliance on the promised $1000.
The requirement for the promisee to perform the particular ex-
pected act, known as reliance of a "definite and substantial character,"
is one that has experienced varying degrees of academic recognition
over the history of promissory estoppel.4 In 1932, the original Re-
statement of Contracts first recognized the doctrine.5 Section 90 of
* For Mary, Elizabeth, Mom, and Dad.
1. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines promise in section 2:
(1) A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in
a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a
commitment has been made. (2) The person manifesting the intention is the
promisor. (3) The person to whom the manifestation is addressed is the
promisee.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981). Furthermore. "the word 'promise' is
not limited to acts having a legal effect." Id § 2 cmt. a.
2. This scenario is based on a hypothetical situation discussed at the 1926 Ameri-
can Law Institute hearings on the Restatement of Contracts. See Discussion of the
Tentative Draft Contracts Restatement No. 2, 4 A.L.I. Proc. app. at 88-114 (1926)
[hereinafter Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2] (remarks of Prof. Williston, re-
porter); infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
3. See, eg., Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101
Yale LJ. 111, 116-18 (1991) (discussing the argument over this hypothetical at the
1926 proceedings of the American Law Institute); see also infra notes 34-37 and ac-
companying text (same). Commentators argue mainly over the proper measure of
damages to be awarded to Nephew, as did the Institute's participants. See Discussion,
Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note 2, app. at 88-114; infra Part ILB.3.
4. A definite and substantial act refers to the particular substantial act expected
to occur in response to the promise. See Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 200 (1952) ("All action is definite after it occurs; so, the Institute must have meant
that the promisor must have had reason to foresee the definite action or forbearance
that in fact followed."); Black's Lav Dictionary 423 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "definite"
as "[flixed, determined, defined, bounded").
5. See Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932).
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the Restatement defined promissory estoppel as follows: "A promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."6 Be-
cause of the weighty reputations of the original framers and their
avowed endeavor to state the prevalent legal principles of the day,
many courts accepted section 90 as the authoritative definition of
promissory estoppel.7
Almost a half-century later, the second Restatement of Contracts
offered a revised version of the doctrine.8 It specifically removed the
requirement for reliance of a definite and substantial character from
section 90.9 The section now reads:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The rem-
edy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.' 0
The former requirement to induce action of a definite and substantial
character was relegated to a comment under section 90 as a factor that
courts might consider in determining the appropriate remedy for the
promisee."
This Note examines whether courts currently require reliance of a
definite and substantial character for the enforcement of promises,
and thus, whether the Restatement in its present form accurately re-
flects the state of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Part I of this
Note discusses the origins of promissory estoppel and its encapsula-
tion in section 90 of each of the two Restatements of Contracts. Part
II outlines the debate over the purpose and application of promissory
estoppel and discusses the importance of definite and substantial reli-
ance to that dialogue. Part III looks at the promissory estoppel cases
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 38-41, 55-56 and accompanying text.
8. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Comment b reads:
Character of reliance protected. The principle of this Section is flexible. The
promisor is affected only by reliance which he does or should foresee, and
enforcement must be necessary to avoid injustice. Satisfaction of the latter
requirement may depend on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance,
on its definite and substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on
the formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to which the
evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling functions of form are met
by the commercial setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such
other policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust
enrichment are relevant. Compare Comment to § 72 [exchange of promise
for performance].
Id. § 90 cmt. b.
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decided in 1997, with particular emphasis on cases involving donative
promises,'2 and evaluates the presence of definite and substantial reli-
ance in those cases. Part IV focuses on the role of definite and sub-
stantial reliance in donative situations and discusses its relation to the
notion of injustice. This Note concludes that courts and litigants use
promissory estoppel to remedy the injustice of promises that are not
fulfilled despite having induced definite and substantial acts in reli-
ance upon them. This Note argues that the current application and
use of promissory estoppel fully resembles neither the view of the sec-
ond Restatement nor the views of most current theorists, but instead
continues to resemble the view encapsulated by Professor Williston in
section 90 of the first Restatement.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE RESTATEMENTS AND
THEIR EFFECTS ON CONTRACTS JURISPRUDENCE
Not all promises are enforceable. 13 Thus, the main object of con-
tract law is to determine which promises should be enforced. 4 For
the most part, promises supported by consideration are enforceable. 5
Originally, the principle of consideration meant simply that the prom-
isor had achieved some benefit, or that the promisee had suffered
some detriment, on account of the promise.' 6 For the past century,
12. A donative promise is a promise to make a gift. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 Calif. L Rev. 821, 823-24 (1997)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, World of Gift]. Professor Eisenberg defines gift as "a volun-
tary transfer that is made, or at least purports to be made, for affective reasons like
love, affection, friendship, comradeship, or gratitude, or to satisfy moral duties or
aspirations like benevolence or generosity, and which is not expressly conditioned on
a reciprocal exchange." Id. at 823 (citation omitted); see also id. at 840-46 (discussing
the difference between the transfer of a gift and the transfer of a commodity).
13. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 123.
14. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. Chi. L Rev. 1, 1 (1979)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Donative Promises] (citation omitted); Melvin Aron Eisen-
berg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 640 (1982) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration]; Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 166. As ob-
served by Professor Morris Cohen:
The actual world, which assuredly is among the possible ones, is not one in
which all promises are kept, and there are many people-not necessarily
diplomats-who prefer a world in which they and others occasionally depart
from the truth and go back on some promise. It is indeed very doubtful
whether there are many who would prefer to live in an entirely rigid world in
which one would be obliged to keep all one's promises instead of the present
more viable system, in which a vaguely fair proportion is sufficient. Many of
us indeed would shudder at the idea of being bound by every promise, no
matter how foolish, without any chance of letting increased wisdom undo
past foolishness. Certainly, some freedom to change one's mind is necessary
for free intercourse between those who lack omniscience.
Morris R Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L Rev. 553, 573 (1933).
15. See Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 640.
16. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.2 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Farns-
worth, Contracts]; Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79
Cornell L. Rev. 1263, 1267 (1994).
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however, the bargain principle' 7 has become the governing principle
of consideration and enforcement.' 8 The bargain principle requires
that a promisor seek a return promise or benefit in exchange for her
promise, which the promisee must provide in exchange for that
promise. 19
Donative promises presented a unique problem for courts applying
the bargain principle, because these types of promises are normally
driven by altruistic motives, and consequently are often difficult to
conceive of as bargains.2" As a result, courts had traditionally refused
to enforce even those donative promises upon which promisees had
relied1.2  But courts did make specific exceptions for various catego-
ries of donative promises, including promises made in contemplation
of marriage, promises made between relatives, gratuitous promises to
give land, and charitable subscriptions.22 Further, courts often en-
forced donative promises if "the underlying transaction could be arti-
ficially construed as a bargain."' Despite these numerous exceptions,
17. The Second Restatement defines bargain as "an agreement to exchange
promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 3 (1981).
18. The Second Restatement defines consideration in section 71: "(1) To consti-
tute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. (2) A
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in ex-
change for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise." Id.
§ 71; see Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 641-43; Jay M.
Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 678, 679 (1984);
Pham, supra note 16, at 1267; see also Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The
Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 Rutgers
L. Rev. 472, 476-78 (1983) (stating that the bargain principle also requires the parties'
mutual consent to be bound).
The bargain principle may not now reign quite so supreme. Professor Eisenberg's
article, Principles of Consideration, discusses bases of enforcement other than the bar-
gain, including promissory estoppel. See Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra
note 14, at 640. In it, he also noted that enforcement of bargains themselves have
been limited where courts find them to be unconscionable. See id. at 640-41 & n.2.
19. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(2) (1981).
20. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 823-24; Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1907-08 (1987).
21. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 19; Eisenberg, Principles
of Consideration, supra note 14, at 656-57; Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Es-
toppel Article, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 303, 304 (1992) [hereinafter Feinman, Last Article].
22. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 6.2 (4th ed.
1998); Farnsworth, Contracts, supra note 16, § 2.19; Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory
Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: 1, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 644 (1952); Eisenberg,
Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 19; Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra
note 14, at 656-57; Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 855; Feinman, Last
Article, supra note 21, at 304 (describing the exceptions as having evolved to avoid
injustice in particular kinds of cases); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Con-
sensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 Colum. L.
Rev. 580, 585 (1998); Warren L. Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35
Mich. L. Rev. 908, 914 (1937).
23. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 19; see also Eisenberg, Princi-
ples of Consideration, supra note 14, at 656-57 (citing Siegel v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E.
414 (N.Y. 1923)). Such an exercise, however, injures the nature of gift-giving:
[Vol. 671220
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unrelied-upon promises were still held to be generally
unenforceable.24
While the First Restatement was based largely upon the bargain
theory of consideration,25 its section 90 transformed the enforcement
regime and enabled a wide acceptance of binding, yet unbargained-
for, promises.' At the time section 90 was conceived, Samuel Willis-
ton-its primary authori 7-and his contemporaries intended it for en-
forcing relied-upon promises in purely donative settings, rather than
in commercial contexts.' For Williston, reliance was a component
that helped identify the type of promise that was deemed worthy of
enforcement; 29 nevertheless, the key to enforcement was the promise
itself rather than the existence of reliance on that promiseY°
According to Williston and the First Restatement, courts enforced
those donative promises that induced reliance of a "definite and sub-
stantial character," i.e., those which contemplated and induced a par-
Conceiving of gifts as bargains not only conceives of what is personal as
fungible, it also endorses the picture of persons as profit-maximizers. A bet-
ter view of personhood should conceive of gifts not as disguised sales, but
rather as expressions of the interrelationships between the self and others.
To relinquish something to someone else by gift is to give of yourself. Such a
gift takes place within a personal relationship with the recipient, or else it
creates one. Commodification stresses separateness both between ourselves
and our things and between ourselves and other people.
Radin, supra note 20, at 1907.
24. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 19; Eisenberg, Principles
of Consideration, supra note 14, at 656-57. Nor does Eisenberg believe that such
promises should be enforced. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 821-25
(discussing the "donative promise principle"); infra notes 63-68 and accompanying
text.
25. See Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 657.
26. See Farnsworth, Contracts, supra note 16, § 1.8 (noting that the Restatement is
highly persuasive authority and also noting that section 90 departed from precedents);
Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 Yale LJ. 643, 656
(1933) (noting that "Section 90 has already become somewhat famous as representing
some modification of the ancient rules of consideration"); Eisenberg, Principles of
Consideration, supra note 14, at 657; infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text; see also
Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 854-55 (describing the original section 90
as an innovation which radically transformed contract law); Charles L Knapp, Reli-
ance in the Revised Restatement The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 52, 53 (1981) (describing section 90 and promissory estoppel as "the
most radical and expansive development[s] of this century in the law of promissory
liability").
27. See Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 657 n.51 (noting
that Corbin may have talked a reluctant Williston into proposing section 90, but also
observing that Williston defended the section "ferociously" at the American Law In-
stitute floor debates (citing Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note 2,
app. at 85-114)).
28. See Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 73 (1974) (noting the then-general
academic and judicial feeling that in commercial, as opposed to donative, settings,
"[p]rofessionals should play the game according to the professional rules ... of offer,
acceptance, and consideration"); Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 133.
29. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 118-19.
30. See Feinman, Last Article, supra note 21, at 305.
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ticular act in reliance.3' In Williston's words, section 90 "covers a case
where there is a promise to give and the promisor knows that the
promisee will rely upon the proposed gift in certain definite ways."32
When such promises occurred, Williston suggested, they were to be
enforced to their full extent.33
Williston's approach to the doctrine was illustrated by a hypotheti-
cal problem that arose at the 1926 proceedings of the American Law
Institute.34 In the scenario presented by a member of the audience,
Uncle, aware that Nephew is considering buying a car, promises
Nephew $1000.31 Nephew, in reliance on the promise, then buys a car,
but for only $600.36 Williston maintained, despite some disagreement
among audience members, that because Nephew had performed the
act expected by Uncle, Uncle would be held to his promise; he would
be liable for the full $1000.31
The influence that the Restatement in general, and section 90 in
particular, has had upon American contract law is extraordinary.38
The framers of the First Restatement endeavored to state the law as it
then existed by clearly setting out mainstream legal principles that
courts used to determine cases. 39 Judges apparently took the framers
at their word: over the next forty-six years, courts cited to the Re-
31. See Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932); Discussion, Contracts Restatement
No. 2, supra note 2, app. at 93 (recording Williston's statement that section 90 covers
promises for which "a reasonable person would say that the promisor expected the
man to do just what he did or that he ought to have expected it"); Eisenberg, Dona-
tive Promises, supra note 14, at 22; Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note
14, at 657.
32. Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note 2, at 89 (remarks of Prof.
Williston, reporter) (emphasis added); see Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 118.
33. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 118-19.
34. See Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note 2, app. at 88-114; see
also Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 23-27; Yorio & Thel, supra note
3, at 116-17.
35. See Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note 2, app. at 88.
36. See id. app. at 95.
37. See id. A famous debate ensued between Williston and members of the audi-
ence over the propriety of holding Uncle to the full extent of his promise when
Nephew's act in reliance amounted to only $600. See id. at 95-96. Williston held his
ground: "Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it has to
be enforced as it is made." Id. at 103. Previously, regarding justice, Williston had
stated that he "should be of the opinion that it was unjust under the circumstances...
for [a] promisor not to do what he said he would." Id. at 87; see also Yorio & Thel,
supra note 3, at 118-19 (discussing Williston's position in this debate).
38. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 19 ("Partly as a result of
section 90 ... the principle of promissory estoppel ... is now an accepted part of
American contract law."); E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1981); Yorio & Thel,
supra note 3, at 111-12.
39. See Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 508, 514-15 (1998).
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statement in over 12,000 cases.4" Indeed, commentators have noted
that over the decades, the Restatement has acquired precedential
value nearly equal to that of a statute.41
Despite the Restatement's vast success with courts, the supremacy
of Williston's conception of the promissory estoppel doctrine within
academic circles was short-lived. In 1936, Fuller and Perdue pub-
lished their famous article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:
1,42 which prompted a shift in focus away from the promise and to-
wards reliance.43 In their article, Fuller and Perdue identified three
interests in contract remedies: expectation, restitution, and reliance.4
They observed that courts normally award expectation damages in or-
der to compensate for lost opportunities, to encourage reliance on
business transactions, and to facilitate commerce.4 s None of these,
they noted, apply to donative promises because such promises are not
given as part of a productive exchange.' Following Fuller and Per-
due, later scholars opined that Williston's and the First Restatement's
requirement for reliance of a definite and substantial character had
existed solely to justify full enforcement of donative promises, i.e., ex-
pectation damages.4 7
The long-developing view of reliance as the key to promissory es-
toppel enforcement was encapsulated in the Second Restatement's re-
vised version of section 90.41 The framers of the Second Restatement
40. See Annual Report, 56 A.L.I. Proc. 22 (1979) (noting citations to the Restate-
ment of Contracts in 12,580 cases as of March 1, 1979); Maggs, supra note 39, at 515
n.72.
41. See Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. Legal Educ. 518,527 (1996)
("Courts are increasingly treating the Restatement as a statute .... [They] typically
look to the Restatement, rather than to even very practical and accessible legal schol-
arship, to ascertain the prevailing contract doctrine.").
42. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936).
43. See Feinman, Last Article, supra note 21, at 305.
44. See id.; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 42, at 53-57.
45. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 42, at 60-66; Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at
119.
46. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 842-43; infra note 132.
47. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, § 6.1; Eisenberg, Donative Promises,
supra note 14, at 23, 25; Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 658
(noting that an "unstated axiom" for Williston was that if promises are enforceable,
they must be enforced to their full extent).
48. See Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 658; Feinman,
Last Article, supra note 21, at 306-07; Knapp, supra note 26, at 58-61. Even though
Eisenberg welcomed the revision, he criticized the Second Restatement for not going
far enough:
[W]hile section 90(1) of... Restatement (Second) marks an improvement
over its [predecessor], it is still subject to a number of serious defects. In
particular, section 90(1) is unnecessarily cluttered; reflects a spurious distinc-
tion between promises as a class and promises upon which reliance can rea-
sonably be expected; wrongly focuses attention on the expectation of the
promisor rather than the reliance of the promisee; and wrongly implies that
expectation, not reliance, is the normal measure of damages in cases in
1223
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reasoned that because the promisee's reliance interest was the basis
for enforcement, reliance interest should also govern her damages.49
The framers expressly revised section 90 in order to recognize reliance
as a measure of damages.5 0 They did so by eliminating the require-
ment for reliance of a definite and substantial character, and adding a
sentence that noted: "The remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires."'"
The Second Restatement also marked a shift in the framers' philos-
ophy towards the nature and purpose of the Restatement itself 5
2
While the intent behind the First Restatement was to state the law as
it then existed, the intent of the Second Restatement's framers was to
state the law as they believed it should be.53 As proposed in Herbert
Wechsler's report to the American Law Institute, the framers chose
"to give weight to all of the considerations that the courts, under a
proper view of the judicial function, deem it right to weigh in theirs."54
The shift to a Restatement that is perhaps more reflective of the Insti-
tute's preferences than of the actual state of the law, however, has not
diminished the Restatement's influence upon courts.55  As of 1997,
judges have cited the Restatements in over 24,000 contracts cases.56
which enforcement is based on the reliance principle. Under a preferable
approach, the Restatement (Second) would provide simply: "A promise
that is reasonably relied upon is enforceable to the extent of the reliance."
Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
49. See Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 658; Feinman,
Last Article, supra note 21, at 306; Knapp, supra note 26, at 58.
50. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 reporter's note (1981) ("The prin-
cipal change from the former [section] 90 is the recognition of the possibility of partial
enforcement."); Continuation of Discussion of the Restatement of the Law, Second,
Contracts, 42 A.L.I. Proc. 296 (1965) ("So the principal change in section 90 is to add
the second sentence, which recognozed the possibility of partial enforcement ... Now,
once you have made that change, then the reqirement of reliance of a definite and
substantial character becomes doubtful." (remarks of Prof. Braucter, reporter)); Ei-
senberg, Principles of Consideration, supra note 14, at 658; see also Eisenberg, Dona-
tive Promises, supra note 14, at 26 (stating that the Second Restatement has rejected
Williston's axiom).
51. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981); see Eisenberg, Principles of
Consideration, supra note 14, at 658; Feinman, Last Article, supra note 21, at 306;
Knapp, supra note 26, at 58. The revised section 90 also expressly recognized the
doctrine's applicability to promises given in commercial settings. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 cmts. b, e & reporter's note (1981); Eisenberg, World of
Gift, supra note 12, at 822-23, 863; Knapp, supra note 26, at 53; Yorio & Thel, supra
note 3, at 133. In addition, the Second Restatement recognizes foreseeable reliance
by third parties. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. c (1981); Pham,
supra note 16, at 1266.
52. See Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 5-12; Maggs, supra note 39, at 516-17.
53. See Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 5-9; Maggs, supra note 39, at 516-17.
54. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150
(1969); see Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 5.
55. See Barnett, supra note 41, at 527; Maggs, supra note 39, at 517.
56. See Annual Report, 74 A.L.I. Proc. 25 (1997) (noting citations to the Restate-
ments of Contracts in 24,671 cases as of April 1, 1997). Thirty of the 350 cases de-
cided in 1997 that were examined for this Note cited to section 90 of the Second
[Vol. 671224
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Despite the consensus among the second Restatement's framers, new
challenges have emerged to their conception of section 90. The next
part outlines a current debate among theorists over section 90's pur-
pose and use.
II. THE DEBATE
A debate currently exists within the academy over the purpose and
application of the promissory estoppel doctrine.5 On one side are the
"Reliance" commentators, who argue that courts use promissory es-
toppel like a tort in order to compensate a promisee for her reason-
able injurious reliance upon a promise.58 For these theorists, any
Restatement in discussing promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Steinke v. Sungard Fin. Sys.,
Inc., 121 F.3d 763, 776 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting parenthetically that Massachusetts has
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90); Servais v. TJ. Manage-
ment of Minneapolis, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 885, 898 (D. Minn. 1997) (citing the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts section 90(1) cmt. b factors for evaluating whether
enforcement of a promise is necessary to prevent an injustice); In re Blunt, 210 B.R.
626, 632-33 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (noting that Florida has adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 90); LeStrange v. Korowotny, No. CV 94046929S, 1997
WL 707101, at *10-*12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1997) (quoting the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 90(1) in refusing to hold a municipality immune from
promissory estoppel liability); Biasotto v. Spreen, No. 96C-04-030-WTQ, 1997 WL
527956, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. July 30, 1997) (noting that Delaware has adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90); Orr v. Westminster Village North,
Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 718 (Ind. 1997) (noting that Indiana has adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts section 90(1)); First See. Say. Bank v. Aitken, 573 N.W.2d
307, 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sec-
tion 90(1) in stating what is required for a promissory estoppel claim); Shoemaker v.
Commonwealth Bank, 700 A.2d 1003, 1006-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (citing the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts section 90(1), its comments, and its illustrations in
reversing summary judgment on a promissory estoppel claim for house insurance);
Engenius Entertainment, Inc., v. Herenton, 971 S.W.2d 12, 19-20 (Tenn. C1. App.
1997) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90(1)); Stangl v. Ernst
Home Ctr., Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the Utah
Supreme Court has defined promissory estoppel by quoting the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts section 90(1)); see also hifra note 140 (stating the parameters for
the cases examined in this Note).
57. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 586. In outlining this debate, this Note focuses
primarily on the works of Professors Melvin Eisenberg, Edward Yorio. and Steve
Thel, arguably the most significant representatives of their respective schools of
thought. Indeed, part V of Eisenberg's World of Gift is a direct response to Yorio's
and Thel's Promissory Basis of Section 90. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note
12, at 853 (discussing Yorio & Thel, supra note 3). As Eisenberg states, "Because
Yorio & Thel's article is so important and so well-argued, and because it is echoed by
other commentary [by Promise theorists], it deserves close and extensive attention."
Id.
58. See, eg., Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 2 (arguing against
the enforcement of donative promises except for those which induced reasonable reli-
ance by promisees); Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 825 (same). In Ques-
tioning the "New Consensus", Professor Hillman compiled statistics from all
promissory estoppel claims brought before courts over a two year period from 1994 to
1996. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 582-83. He concluded that reliance is crucial to a
claim's success, a point he emphatically repeats throughout his article. See id. at 618-
19.
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reasonably foreseeable act in reliance upon a promise suffices to apply
the doctrine, and thus, a definite and substantial character standard is
inappropriately high.59 On the other side are the "Promise" theo-
rists60 who argue that promissory estoppel is actually a contracts doc-
trine that courts use to enforce promises that result from
deliberation.61 These commentators argue that anticipation and inter-
nalization of the promise's consequences, i.e., the prospect of definite
and substantial reliance, is what distinguishes those serious promises
that courts should enforce.6' Their conception, therefore, requires re-
liance of a definite and substantial character. As a result of these dif-
ferent approaches to promissory estoppel, the two camps disagree not
only over the need for definite and substantial reliance, but also over
the need for actual inducement of the promisee, and the appropriate
remedy when applied. This part carefully examines each of these
differences.
A. Promise vs. Reliance Generally
On one side of the promissory estoppel debate is the Reliance posi-
tion, which focuses on donative promises and argues that the basis for
enforcement is injurious reliance.63 These scholars suggest that, for
both substantive and process-related reasons, donative promises gen-
erally are not, and should not be, enforceable. 6' Substantively, rou-
tine enforcement of donative promises would undermine the
benevolent motives behind the promises, thereby impoverishing the
donative relationship between the parties. 65 Further, this enforce-
ment would fail to account for conditions that would morally obligate
the promisee to release the promisor from honoring the promise, such
as improvidence on the part of the promisor or ingratitude on the part
of the promisee.66 In addition to these substantive justifications, the
Reliance position argues, courts should also generally refuse to en-
force donative promises for process reasons, namely, because such
59. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 21-22.
60. This Note uses the terms "Reliance" and "Promise" to refer to these two
schools of thought.
61. See, e.g., Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 167 (arguing that the enforceability of
promises turns on "the proof and quality of the promisor's commitment").
62. See id. at 113.
63. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 821-22; Richard A. Posner,
Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. Legal Stud. 411, 416 (1977).
64. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 821-23.
65. See id. at 846-49.
66. See id. at 821-23, 849-50; infra note 229; see also Eisenberg, Donative Promises,
supra note 14, at 6 ("The potential availability of these excuses further explains the
insecurity of a donative promisee's expectation."); Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology
for Consideration, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 942-43 (1958) (noting that promises are
"limited by rather vague and unspecified excuses, such as 'change of circumstances' or
'unforeseen disadvantages' or even, possibly, 'conflicting but overlooked prior en-
gagement"' which, in turn, limit the intensity of the promisor's expectation).
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promises usually lack deliberation and are often poorly evidenced.67
But the Reliance position further suggests that these concerns should
be superseded when a promisee injuriously relies on a donative prom-
ise, because "[a] relying promisee has suffered not merely disappoint-
ment of the expectation created by the promise, but an actual
diminution of ... wealth."' 6
Promise scholars, on the other hand, believe that the key to promis-
sory estoppel lies in the promise itself.69 They believe that ultimately,
"courts respond to an impulse to enforce serious promises. '70 As a
result, courts look for promises given after deliberation, rather than
impulse, and enforce only those promises.71 According to these schol-
ars, a promisor who makes a promise after considering its conse-
quences has manifested an intention to be bound to that promise.72
Reliance, then, is merely a factor in identifying a seriously-considered
promise worthy of enforcement, rather than the basis of enforcement
itself.73
These divergent conceptions of the promissory estoppel doctrine
are revealed through the way these two groups would approach the
hypothetical situation between Uncle and Nephew.74 Uncle, aware
that Nephew desires to purchase a new car, promises to give Nephew
$1000. Nephew, relying on Uncle's promise, buys himself a new car.
Both Reliance and Promise commentators would likely apply promis-
sory estoppel to a subsequent refusal by Uncle to pay Nephew, but for
different reasons. The Reliance position would provide Nephew with
a remedy due to his reasonable reliance on Uncle's promise, i.e., his
purchase of the car. Uncle injured Nephew by his promise that he
knew could, and did, induce an act in reliance by Nephew. Uncle's
refusal to compensate Nephew for that reasonable reliance is an injus-
tice that merits enforcement. Promise theorists, on the other hand,
would enforce Uncle's promise because Uncle made it with an inten-
tion to be bound. Uncle made the promise expecting Nephew to re-
spond by buying a car. His promise was therefore deliberative, not
impulsive. Uncle made it after considering its consequences, thereby
manifesting his acceptance of those consequences and an intent to be
bound to them. In these circumstances, promise theorists would say
that injustice would lie in Uncle's failure to do what he said he would
do. In both situations, the divergent conceptions of the doctrine's pur-
pose affects how it is ultimately applied.
67. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 3-4, 18-19.
68. Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 834.
69. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 166.
70. Id. at 114.
71. See id at 124.
72. See id at 124-25.
73. See id at 111-13.
74. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
1227
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
B. Breakdown of the Reliance-Promise Controversy
The larger debate over the purpose of the promissory estoppel doc-
trine has resulted in disagreements over three primary issues of its
application: whether definite and substantial reliance is required;
whether actual inducement of the promisee is required; and whether
the appropriate measure of damages is expectation or reliance. This
section examines each of these issues in turn.
1. Definite and Substantial Reliance
The First Restatement required reliance of a definite and substan-
tial character for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.7"
As Williston proclaimed: "We have confined the Section to the case
where a reasonable person would say that the promisor expected the
man to do just what he did or that he ought to have expected it."'76 In
the shift towards the recognition of partial enforcement of promises,77
however, the requirement for definite and substantial reliance came
under increasing attack.78 Commentators criticized it, opining that it
existed only to justify the discarded axiom that all enforceable
promises must be honored in full.79 Accordingly, the Second Restate-
ment deleted the requirement that reliance must be of a definite and
substantial character in order to enforce the promise.80
The requirement for definite and substantial reliance, as opposed to
reliance that is merely reasonable, is the key to the Promise theorists'
conception of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 81 In fact, they in-
sist that its deletion from the Second Restatement was in error.82
Courts, they argue, have always-and still do-routinely require reli-
ance of a definite and substantial character, but do so because of the
requirement's effect upon promisors in making their promises.8 3 Ac-
cording to Promise scholars, it is the promisor's expectation of definite
and substantial reliance on her promise that indicates the serious na-
ture of the promise.' This requirement for definiteness ensures that a
promisor has weighed and accepted the act that is expected to flow
75. See Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932).
76. Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note 2, at 93 (remarks of Prof.
Williston, reporter) (emphasis added).
77. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 reporter's note (1981); Yorio &
Thel, supra note 3, at 127; supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
78. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, § 6.1; Eisenberg, Donative Promises,
supra note 14, at 23-26.
79. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, § 6.1; Eisenberg, Donative Promises,
supra note 14, at 23-26; infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
80. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 91 & reporter's note (1981). The
significance of the deletion was not fully elaborated upon or understood. See infra
note 91 and accompanying text.
81. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 123-29, 151-61.
82. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
83. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 113, 124-27.
84. See id.
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from her promise." Similarly, the requirement for substantiality en-
sures that the promisor is conscious of the gravity of the expected
act. 6 Promise scholars suggest that by screening out carefully-consid-
ered promises, the existence of the prospect of definite and substantial
reliance performs a function similar to that of reciprocity in the bar-
gain principle. 7
Promise commentators argue that despite the Second Restate-
ment's rejection of the requirement of definite and substantial reli-
ance, courts still continue to apply it.' For example, Professors Yorio
and Thel assert that, notwithstanding the language of section 90 and
commentary on its application, "[j]udges actually enforce promises
rather than protect reliance in section 90 cases."8 9 While acknowledg-
ing that the function of the prospect of definite and substantial reli-
ance is not widely recognized' 0 or understood,91 Professors Yorio and
Thel nevertheless point out that all of the cases that the Second Re-
statement provides to illustrate the application of promissory estoppel
under section 90(1) involve promises with a prospect of definite and
substantial reliance.92
85. See id at 127.
86. See id at 126-27.
87. See id at 127; supra note 18 and accompanying text. In addition, the prom-
isee's definite and substantial act can increase the likelihood that a promise was made.
See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 157. But see Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra
note 14, at 18-19 (stating that the existence of even merely reasonable reliance does
not increase the likelihood that a promise was in fact made).
88. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 127-29.
89. Id. at 111.
90. See id. at 113.
91. Yorio and Thel note that Professor Braucher, the reporter for the Second Re-
statement, did not address this aspect of the definite and substantial requirement at
the American Law Institute proceedings on the Second Restatement, "and the funda-
mental change effected by deleting the 'definite and substantial' clause was not fully
appreciated." Id. at 127; see also Knapp, supra note 26, at 59 (stating that the deletion
of the definite and substantial requirement causes some "confusing 'legislative his-
tory"' and may in fact be inaccurate).
92. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 162 & n.344 (citing D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d
684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687
(W.D. Wis. 1974), affd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976); Crail v. Blakely, 505 P.2d 1027
(Cal. 1973); Burgess v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 P. 1029 (Cal. 1930);
Graddon v. Knight, 292 P.2d 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144
A.2d 123 (Del. 1958); Kauffman v. Miller, 214 Ill. App. 213 (1919); Miller v. Lawlor,
66 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1954); Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930); Devecmon v.
Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888); McLearn v. Hill, 177 N.E. 617 (Mass. 1931); Huhtala v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640 (Mich. 1977); Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Univer-
sal Credit Co., 145 So. 623 (Miss. 1933); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1959); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Aiello v. Knoll Golf
Club, 165 A.2d 531 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275
(NJ. Ch. 1922), aff-d mem., 124 A. 925 (N.J. 1924); Spiegel v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
160 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1959); Siegel v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923); Hamer v.
Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891); Spector v. National Cellulose Corp., 48 N.Y.S.2d 234
(Sup. Ct. 1943), affd, 47 N.Y.S.2d 311 (App. Div. 1944); East Providence Credit
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On the other hand, Reliance theorists, who were influential in jet-
tisoning this requirement in the second Restatement, 93 require only
uncompensated reasonable reliance rather than definite and substan-
tial reliance.94 They note that reasonable reliance of any character, in
and of itself, does not cure the problems presented by the donative
promise principle.95 For one, it does not address the potential moral
reasons that might obligate a promisee to release the promisor from
honoring the promise.96 In addition, there remain the significant pro-
cess problems, both evidentiary and cautionary, that accompany dona-
tive promises.97 The existence of reliance, according to the Reliance
argument, can just as likely occur in the absence of a promise as in the
presence of one.98 And, while the prospect of definite and substantial
reliance may have a sobering effect upon promisors by making them
think twice, the Reliance position points out that donative promisors'
motives are still "altruistic rather than calculating." 99 Therefore, such
promises might not be as deliberative as the Promise commentators
allege. 100
Nevertheless, according to the Reliance position, a cognizable in-
jury suffered by a donative promisee in reasonable reliance on the
promise provides a powerful substantive reason for enforcement that
outweighs those negative reasons against it.1°1 The first Restate-
ment's section 90 stated that actionable reliance must be both reason-
able and foreseeable.0 2 Moreover, the de minimis doctrine and the
barrier of litigation costs would together operate to screen out frivo-
lous claims.'0 3 Therefore, say Reliance commentators, there exists no
Union v. Geremia, 239 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1968); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d
267 (Wis. 1965)).
93. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 127-29.
94. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 20-22.
95. See id. at 18-20.
96. See id. at 5-6.
97. See id. at 18-19; Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 833-34.
98. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 18; Eisenberg, World of
Gift, supra note 12, at 833.
99. Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 834; see Eisenberg, Donative
Promises, supra note 14, at 18-19.
100. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 834; see also Eisenberg, Dona-
tive Promises, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that the persistence of these problems may
help explain why courts traditionally refuse to enforce even relied-upon donative
promises); supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (describing the traditional reluc-
tance to enforce donative promises).
101. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 834. Eisenberg states: "A don-
ative promisor's refusal to reimburse the promisee for a diminution in the promisee's
wealth resulting from reliance on the promise takes the relationship out of the affec-
tive realm" and moves it into the "world of contract." Id. at 851.
102. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 21-22 (discussing the Re-
statement of Contracts section 90).
103. See id.
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reason to deny a remedy to a promisee who has relied reasonably on a
promise and suffered a meaningful detriment."°
Reliance commentators also dispute the Promise theorists' interpre-
tation of the actual state of the law.105 First, they note that Professors
Yorio and Thel base their premise on cases involving gratuitous
promises given in purely commercial settings.106 Such promises, they
argue, normally resemble and are related to bargains, and thus are
properly enforced as bargains. 10 7 In contrast, courts do not enforce
donative promises that have not been relied upon, no matter how seri-
ous or well-documented they were when made." In addition, the
Reliance position argues that an attempt like W'lliston's, Yorio's, or
Thel's to state the law "as it is," without regard to what the law should
be, is a fundamentally flawed approachY°9
104. Eisenberg argues: "But if the promisee relied, and the promisor should rea-
sonably have expected to induce reliance-as must be the case under the introductory
clause of section 90-how could the law justifiably refuse to enforce the promise on
the ground that the promisor need not have expected the promisee to do 'just' what
he did?" Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 22. He further observes that
"if a donative promisee's reliance is nontrivial and consists of action that the promisor
should reasonably have expected to indue ... how could the law justifiably refuse to
enforce the promise, at least to the extent of the reliance?" Id. at 21-22.
105. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 854.
106. See id. at 856-57.
107. See id Donative promises are driven by affective motives such as generosity
or gratitude and are not expressly conditioned upon a reciprocal exchange. See id. at
823; supra note 12 and accompanying text. Eisenberg and the Reliance position ac-
knowledge a trend towards full enforcement of commercial promises. See Eisenberg,
World of Gift, supra note 12, at 832-33, 863; infra note 133.
108. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 821-22. Eisenberg discusses,
among others, the famous case of Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919). See
Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 821-22. In Dougherty, the New York
Court of Appeals, per Judge Cardozo, refused to enforce Aunt Tillie's promise to give
$3000 to her nephew Charlie, despite her having recorded the promise in a signed
promissory note "for value received." Dougherty, 125 N.E. at 95.
109. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 854. "An unspoken but under-
lying premise of Yorio and Thel's enterprise is that it is possible to interpret doctrinal
authority wholly without regard to what the law should be as a matter of morals,
policy, and experience. This premise is incorrect, and Yorio and Thel's entire enter-
prise is correspondingly flawed." Id Eisenberg explains:
[A] deciding court always has power to distinguish away what a precedent
court said in favor of what it did, on the ground that what the court did was
narrower, broader, or just different than what it said. The extent to which
courts exercise this power, and more generally the way in which courts inter-
pret a precedent, always depends in part on the extent to which the rule
announced in the precedent is congruent or incongruent with the rule that
the deciding court would adopt on a clean slate based on those propositions
of morality, policy, and experience that the courts can properly take into
account. Just such a principle has guided the Restatements in modem times:
Restatement rules are to "give weight to all of the considerations that the
courts, under a proper view of the judicial function, deem it right to weigh"
in their deliberations.
Id. (quoting Wechsler, supra note 54, at 150); see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying
text-
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2. Inducement
Reliance and Promise commentators disagree over whether actual
inducement of the promisee is necessary for application of promissory
estoppel. Looking at the Uncle and Nephew hypothetical again,
Nephew performed an expected act in reliance on Uncle's promise by
purchasing the car. Commentators dispute whether Nephew, in order
to have the promise enforced, must show that he would not otherwise
have purchased the car but for Uncle's promise. Reliance theorists
would require Nephew to show actual inducement, while Promise the-
orists would argue that occurrence of the purchase alone is sufficient.
According to the Reliance approach, if a promisee has not under-
taken her act or forbearance solely because of the promise, then she
has not been injured by the promise."' This position suggests that the
promisee's injury provides the substantive reason that justifies enforc-
ing an otherwise unenforceable donative promise."' Accordingly, if
there is no injury, then there is no justification for enforcement." 2
This coincides with the Reliance view of contracts as protective of in-
jurious reliance." 3
Promise theorists, on the other hand, require only the occurrence of
the expected act, rather than a showing of actual inducement.' 4 A
promise made with the prospect of a definite and substantial act by
110. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 834-36. In Branca v. Board of
Education, Sachem Central School District, 657 N.Y.S.2d 445 (App. Div. 1997), the
court reversed summary judgment for plaintiffs for failure to demonstrate actual in-
ducement. Id. at 446-47. There, the school board had re-designated several public
employees in "confidential/managerial" positions, thereby requiring them to with-
draw from a collective staff association. Id. at 446. The school board, however, re-
solved to grant those employees the same benefits negotiated with the school district
by the members of the staff association. See id. After 15 years, the school board dis-
continued the policy when it negotiated a new labor agreement with the staff associa-
tion. See id. The confidential/managerial employees sued, seeking the new increased
benefits. See id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. See id.
The appellate division reversed, noting that "even assuming that manifest injustice
resulted, estoppel may be invoked against a governmental agency only where the mis-
conduct of the agency has induced justifiable reliance by a party who then changes
position to his or her detriment." Id. at 446-47 (citation omitted). The court held that:
[Q]uestions of fact exist concerning the possible applicability of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel since it is unclear whether any of the petitioners
changed their positions to their detriment in reliance upon the Resolution.
The petitioners' conclusory assertions that they had the option of accepting
non-confidential positions, which would have allowed them to remain mem-
bers of the [staff association], are inadequate to conclude that by accepting
or continuing in confidential job titles they thereby changed their positions
to their detriment. Accordingly, the lower court erred in making a summary
determination upon the pleadings.
Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
111. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 191, 253 and accompanying text.
114. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 151-61.
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the promisee is sufficiently serious to justify enforcement.11 5 Subse-
quent occurrence of that expected act serves as evidence that the
promise was indeed made, and made with that expectation in mind." 6
Accordingly, these commentators suggest, courts treat the mere oc-
currence of the act as conclusive proof of inducement, without inquir-
ing whether a promisee was actually induced to act solely because of
the promise.117 Therefore, when courts speak of reliance, they mean
only that a promisee acted in contemplation of the promise, not neces-
sarily in sole reliance on the promise.'1 8 This accords with the view
that the promisor's promise, rather than the promisee's reliance, is the
basis for enforcement of the promise.1 19
115. See id. at 152. This raises questions regarding whether and when a promisor
who makes a promise with the prospect of causing a definite and substantial act in
reliance may rescind that promise.
116. See id.
117. See id. To illustrate their contention that courts do not in fact require actual
inducement, Professors Yorio and Thel discuss the classic case, Devecmon v. Shaw, 14
A. 464 (Md. 1888). See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 155 (discussing Devecmon). In
Devecmon, Uncle had promised Nephew that he would pay for Nephew's expenses
for a trip to Europe. See Devecmon, 14 A. at 464-65. After making the trip to Europe,
Nephew sought reimbursement from Uncle's estate for his expenses. See id. The
Maryland Supreme Court held Uncle's estate liable for the expenses in the event that
a promise was made. See id. It ruled that Nephew's expenses constituted considera-
tion for Uncle's promise to pay. See id.
The court did not require Nephew to prove that he would not have taken the trip if
not for Uncle's promise, and indicated that the issue was not relevant to its ruling: "It
might very well be, and probably was the case, that [Nephew] would not have taken a
trip to Europe at his own expense. But, whether this be so or not, the testimony
would have tended to show that [Nephew] incurred expense at the instance and re-
quest of [Uncle] ... ." Id. In addition, the court found that an inquiry into whether
Nephew benefited from the trip was also not relevant. See id. at 465. Yorio and Thel
note that this holding undermines the Reliance contention that application of promis-
sory estoppel requires that a promisee suffer detriment on account of the promise. See
Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 155.
Professor Hillman argues that Devecnon and the other cases cited by the Promise
scholars, in support of their proposition that inducement and detriment are not re-
quired, can also be interpreted in accordance with the proposition that these elements
are in fact required. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 612-14. He argues, for example,
that the Devecmon court's observation that "[i]t might very well be, and probably was
the case, that [Nephew] would not have taken [the] trip to Europe at his own ex-
pense" indicates the court's belief that Nephew probably was induced by Uncle's
promise. Id. at 613 (quoting Devecmon, 14 A. at 464). Hillman concludes that -[t]he
cases [cited by Promise scholars] ... suggest the indispensability of detrimental reli-
ance to a favorable outcome." Id at 603.
118. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 159-60.
119. See infra Part II.A. Yorio and Thel acknowledge that both Restatements re-
quire that the promise actually induce the promisee's reliance. See Yorio & Thel,
supra note 3, at 152. Williston, more so than the others, might then be able to claim to
be "analyz[ing] what courts are doing instead of trying to force cases into accepted
theories." Id- at 114. Nevertheless, Yorio and Thel claim that courts in fact do not
require inducement. See id. at 152. This can lend credence to Williston's suggestion,
echoed by Promise commentators, that the framers craft the Restatement to state
simply, to the extent practicable, what courts actually do rather than force cases into
preconceived theories. See Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Contracts, Restatement
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3. Damages
Reliance and Promise commentators disagree over the appropriate
measure of damages in applications of promissory estoppel. Using the
Uncle-Nephew hypothetical, Uncle promised Nephew $1000.121
Nephew only purchased his car for $600.121 Promise commentators
would hold Uncle liable to the full extent of his promise, because the
act that he expected to occur, the car purchase, did indeed occur.122
Accordingly, they would award Nephew $1000. Reliance theorists, on
the other hand, would argue that Nephew should be compensated to
the extent of his injury in reliance on Uncle's promise."z They would
therefore limit Nephew's recovery to $600.
Promise commentators view the promisee's expectation as the
proper measure of damages in promissory estoppel cases.12 4 For
them, the promise itself is the basis for enforcement; any promise
which is identified as seriously considered, whether because it is sup-
ported by consideration or made with the prospect of definite and
substantial reliance, is fully enforceable. 1' This view does not permit
for partial enforcement-either a promise is binding or it is not.12 6 It
accords with the moral principle underlying promise-enforcement:
having achieved her expected result, a promisor should do what she
said she would do.'27
The Reliance approach, on the other hand, holds that reliance is the
proper measure of damages for the application of promissory estop-
pel.128 This approach reasons that the basis for enforcement of a don-
ative promise is the injury suffered by the promisee. 2 9 Thus, courts
No. 1, 3 A.L.I. Proc. 159 (1925) ("The endeavor in this Restatement is to restate the
law as it is."); Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 114.
120. The hypothetical was originally crafted for the purpose of disputing damages.
See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
124. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 130-51.
125. See id. at 113.
126. See id. at 113, 118-19.
127. See id. at 118-19. Williston, and the First Restatement, shared this view of
enforcement: "Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it
has to be enforced as it is made." Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note
2, app. at 103 (remarks of Prof. Williston, reporter); see Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at
116-19. Williston vigorously defended his view that Uncle would be liable for the full
$1000 which he had promised despite equally vigorous disagreement at the 1926
A.L.I. Proceedings. See Discussion, Contracts Restatement No. 2, supra note 2, app. at
95-114; Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 116-19; see also Eisenberg, Principles of Consid-
eration, supra note 14, at 657 n.51 (noting Williston's spirited defense of section 90).
Eisenberg, a Reliance commentator, has described Williston's argument in that de-
bate as an example of the "extreme conceptualism of which he was occasionally capa-
ble." Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 24.
128. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 836.
129. See id.
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should remedy that injury by compensating the promisee's reliance.'"
In bargain situations, where parties have exchanged commitments, ex-
pectation damages are appropriate to facilitate commerce by encour-
aging trust in exchanges, enabling future planning, and compensating
foregone alternative bargains. 131 But, the Reliance position suggests,
because donative promises do not occur as part of a productive ex-
change and are instead voluntary promises to bestow gifts, 132 expecta-
tion damages are unnecessary and would "compensate" a promisee
for something she never had. 33
Reliance commentators recognize that the First Restatement re-
flected Williston's own view that promises are either enforceable or
not enforceable. " They point out, though, that reliance has since
been recognized as a legitimate substantive basis for promise enforce-
ment.13 5 Accordingly, the Second Restatement adopted this newer
view of promise enforcement 36 and rejected the old axiom that en-
forceable promises must be enforced in full. 137
130. See id.
131. See id. at 832-35.
132. See id. at 842-43. Fuller and Perdue state that awards of expectation damages
facilitate commerce by compensating for lost opportunities and encouraging reliance
on business transactions. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 42, at 60-66. They conclude
that neither of these bases apply to donative promises because donative promises do
not normally occur as part of a productive exchange. See id..
133. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 833-35. Eisenberg criticizes
Thel and Yorio for citing primarily commercial promises in support of their proposi-
tion that courts usually award expectation damages in promissory estoppel cases. See
id. at 856-57. He states that such promises normally occur in an implied bargain con-
text, and thus are properly enforced as bargains. See id.; supra note 107.
134. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 23-26.
135. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 826-27 (discussing Lon L
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941)). Professor Fuller
identified three substantive bases for enforcing promises: (1) the protection of reli-
ance; (2) the prevention of unjust enrichment; and (3) respect for private autonomy.
See Fuller, supra, at 806-13. He concluded that none of these substantive bases ap-
plied to cases involving simple (unrelied-upon) donative promises. See id. at 815. In
addition, he identified three formal bases: (1) an evidentiary safeguard ensuring that
a promise was actually made; (2) a cautionary safeguard screening out impulsive
promises; and (3) a channeling function signifying the promisor's intent to be bound.
See id. at 800-02; supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
136. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 25-26. The Second Re-
statement expressly provided for partial enforcement by eliminating the requirement
for definite and substantial reliance and adding the clause stating that the remedy can
be limited as justice requires. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 reporter's
note (1981); Continuation of Discussion of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Con-
tracts, 42 A.L.I. Proc. 296-97 (1965) (remarks of Prof. Braucher, reporter); supra text
accompanying notes 48-51. The Reliance commentators have stated that the reason
for the requirement of definite and substantial reliance was to justify expectation
damages. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, § 6.1; Eisenberg, Donative Promises,
supra note 14, at 25; Knapp, supra note 26, at 58.
137. This axiom of Williston's, Eisenberg suggests, had produced "counter-intui-
tive" results, such as the award of $1000 for Nephew. See Eisenberg, Donative
Promises, supra note 14, at 25-26; supra text accompanying notes 34-37. Professor
Hillman reports that his survey revealed a flexibility in both courts' and litigants'
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To bolster their respective positions, Reliance and Promise scholars
both assert that the cases support their positions, 13 or at the very
least, that the cases disprove the other side's approach. 139 Therefore,
part III looks at the 1997 cases, particularly those involving donative
promises, in an effort to determine which side held the prevalent view
during that year.
III. THE 1997 CASES
The most effective way to evaluate courts' attitudes toward the ap-
plication of promissory estoppel is to examine how they actually apply
the doctrine. This part looks at the promissory estoppel cases decided
by the courts in 1997.140 It examines the character of the reliance
upon the promises to which courts applied promissory estoppel princi-
ples in both commercial and donative contexts. It concludes that
courts generally apply promissory estoppel to promises upon which
promisees have relied in definite and substantial fashion.
When looking at these cases, it is important to remember that
courts' views of the doctrine and their motives behind its application
are often not readily decipherable from the language of their opinions.
Most courts state adherence to the doctrine as expressed by section 90
of the Second Restatement. 14 1 Nevertheless, after doing so, many of
these courts list definite and substantial reliance as a requirement, as
did the First Restatement. 42 Some courts also set forth variations of
views of promissory estoppel remedies, thus underscoring the importance of section
90's permission to limit the remedy as justice requires. See Hillman, supra note 22, at
601, 610. He also notes, however, that the courts' approach is inconclusive because of:
a lack of clarity in discussing the remedy; the fact that reliance and expectation dam-
ages are often identical; the intervention of other theories of recovery; and adherence
to the damages requested by claimants. See id. at 601-02.
138. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
140. A search of the "ALLCASES" database in Westlaw using the parameters
[da(1997) and ("promissory estoppel" or 156k85 or (restatement /5 "90")) and (rely
or reliance or relies or relied)] generated 350 unrestricted cases. The term "156k85" is
Westlaw's "key" indicator for promissory estoppel. A list of these cases is on file with
the Fordham Law Review.
141. See, e.g., Steinke v. Sungard Fin. Sys., Inc., 121 F.3d 763,776-77 (1st Cir. 1997);
see also Hillman, supra note 22, at 597 (noting a general acceptance that "courts still
speak the language of reliance").
142. This possible continuity can indicate an internalization of the requirement byjudges, or may simply reflect the effect of stare decisis. See Cole v. Knoll, Inc., 984 F.
Supp. 1117, 1133 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (finding that plaintiff's purchase of a house and
resignation from the military were insufficient reliance upon at-will employment, and
that plaintiff had also failed to show a clear promise); Creative Demos, Inc. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that because
plaintiff still profited despite defendant's broken promise, plaintiff had not relied to
her detriment), vacated, 142 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 1998); Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v.
Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Tex. 1997) (refusing to apply promissory estoppel to
a Texas statute requiring that all real estate brokers' commission agreements be in
writing, and that a broker's reliance on an oral agreement was unreasonable for that
very reason); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1214 (6th ed. 1990) (describing promis-
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the requirement for definite and substantial reliance, many of which
are tied closely to the detriment suffered by the promisee. 143 There-
fore, in addition to what courts said in 1997, this part looks at what
they did.
A. Commercial Promises
Commercial promises that result in concrete reliance normally have
induced reliance of a definite and substantial character. Although
promises occurring in commercial settings are the most often litigated
under section 90,'" most of these claims fail on account of either a
defect in the promise itself 4 ' or a failure by the plaintiff to allege
sory estoppel with First Restatement "definite and substantial character" language
but then citing to the Second Restatement).
143. See Fischer v. Allied Signal Corp., 974 F. Supp. 797, 809 (D.NJ. 1997) (requir-
ing that plaintiff "suffer[ ] a definite and substantial detriment as a result of the reli-
ance such that the promise should be enforced to avoid injustice" and ruling that an
employer's advice that volunteering for a supervisory post would accelerate career
growth did not immunize an employee from the effects of a departmental reorganiza-
tion); Duncan v. Office Depot, 973 F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (D. Or. 1997) (requiring "a
substantial change in position by the party seeking [enforcement]" and finding that
promissory estoppel does not apply to employer modifications of at-will employment
contracts); Perez v. Alcoa Fujikura, Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 991, 1011 n.1l (W.D. Tex. 1997)
(requiring "substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment" to estop use of the
parol evidence rule and alter a valid written contract); DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Com-
munications Inc., 968 F. Supp. 963, 990-92 (D.NJ. 1997) (requiring that a promisee
must experience a detriment of definite and substantial nature in reliance on the
promise and allowing a claim based upon the refusal of another job offer in reliance
upon a promise of continued employment, but doubting whether the claim would
succeed at trial because a severance agreement alleviated the injury); Creative Demos,
955 F. Supp. at 1037-38 (holding that because plaintiff still profited despite defend-
ant's broken promise, plaintiff had not relied to her detriment); Mitchell v. Bingham
Mem'l Hosp., 942 P.2d 544, 549 (Idaho 1997) (requiring that the detriment suffered be
"substantial in an economic sense" in ruling that the willingness of a hospital to nego-
tiate medical and legal bills for plaintiff's injuries did not alleviate plaintiffs failure to
file timely tort-claim notice pursuant to state statute).
144. Only three out of the 350 unrestricted 1997 cases involved arguably donative
promises. See supra note 140.
145. Many courts look first for the existence of a clear promise when applying
promissory estoppel. See, eg., Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 682 N.E.2d 68,70 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997) (requiring a promise clear enough for a reasonable person to believe that an
offer was made); see also Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory
EstoppeL" Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. Chi. L Rev. 903, 914
(1985) (stating three factors that increase the likelihood of recovery: (1) the existence
of a credible promise; (2) the promisor's authority to make the promise, and (3) a
return benefit from economic activity); Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 161-66 (discuss-
ing courts' examinations of promises in section 90 cases).
Some cases also fail due to a lack of authority on the part of the promisor. See
Farber & Matheson, supra, at 917-18; see also, eg., Volvovitz v. Protein Sciences
Corp., No. CV 970057952S, 1997 WL 397464, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 26, 1997)
(ruling that promises by individual directors cannot bind the corporation and rejecting
a promissory estoppel claim brought by a corporate president and director "who can
be assumed to know the corporate law of this state"). Farber and Matheson discuss
the importance of agency principles in promissory estoppel cases, noting that many
courts do not detect the agency issue and instead, for example, label the reliance
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concrete reliance.'46 A commercial promise is typically made deliber-
ately in order to cause a reaction by a promisee. 147 The expected act
in reliance is usually made clear by the commercial circumstances
under which the promise is made. 148 This effect has prompted many
commentators to identify a judicial trend towards general enforce-
ment of commercial promises,'149 noting that because such promises
unreasonable. See Farber & Matheson, supra, at 917-18. They note Ryan v. J. C. Pen-
ney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980), as an example of a case that would have been
better decided on agency principles. See Farber & Matheson, supra, at 919. In Ryan,
the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce promises by a department manager and a
branch personnel manager of a national department store that the plaintiff would not
be fired except for just cause. See Ryan, 627 F.2d at 838. The court ruled that "with-
out a promise of employment for a definite term or consideration beyond services
rendered, no enforceable employment contract is created." Id. While Farber and
Matheson concur in the result, they argue that the local managers' lack of authority
would have been a better basis for the court's decision. See Farber & Matheson,
supra, at 919. They note that "[i]t is doubtful that local personnel had actual authority
to grant life tenure or that an employee could reasonably believe that such authority
existed." Id.
146. See, e.g., Croslan v. Housing Auth., 974 F. Supp. 161, 169 (D. Conn. 1997)
("[Plaintiff's] failure to seek other employment is not forbearance of a definite and
substantial character as a matter of law because there is not sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable person could find that [the plaintiff] failed to look for other work
in detrimental reliance on the alleged promises." (quoting Engstrom v. John Nuveen
& Co., 668 F. Supp. 953, 962-63 (E.D. Pa. 1987))). But see infra Part III.A.2 (discuss-
ing a ruling that an employee "accepts" an employer's "offer" of employment benefits
by continuing to work in reliance upon the promise, thereby creating a binding
agreement).
Sometimes, this requirement for a concrete act in reliance is confused with the re-
quirement for reliance of a definite and substantial character. See supra note 4 (defin-
ing definite and substantial reliance); see also Hillman, supra note 22, at 596
(discussing the possibility that parties mistakenly believe that the rate of success for
promissory estoppel claims is much greater than in actuality, and as a result, parties
are "throwing in ... claims only as subsidiary theories tacked on to a contract or other
claim, sometimes even as an afterthought"). The likelihood of "thrown in" claims
would appear to be greater in commercial contexts, due to the multifaceted nature of
the disputes. See Cole, 984 F. Supp. at 1132 ("It is common for... plaintiff[s] asserting
[implied just-cause contract] claims to add a 'throw-in' count asserting promissory
estoppel.").
147. See Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in
Commercial Promissory Estoppel Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 943, 951.
148. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp.
106 (D. Mass. 1997)).
149. For example, Farber and Matheson identify an important role played by eco-
nomic activity in the application of promissory estoppel. See Farber & Matheson,
supra note 145, at 904-05. They argue that a return of economic benefits, tangible or
intangible, to a promisor as a result of the promise is such a significant factor in en-
forcement that they advocate a new version of the doctrine. See id. at 929. Their
proposed version states simply: "[Clommitments made in furtherance of economic
activity should be enforced." Id.; see also Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at
832-33 (concurring that promises made in commercial contexts are regularly
enforced).
Professor Jay Feinman has criticized both sides of the debate for the failure to ac-
knowledge the importance of context and relations between parties in the enforce-
ment of unbargained-for promises. See Feinman, Last Article, supra note 21, at 307-09.
He praises commentators such as Farber and Matheson for taking the first steps away
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often resemble bargains, they are rightly enforced as bargain con-
tracts.15 0 To illustrate, this section discusses three 1997 commercial
promise cases: Guckenberger v. Boston University, Doyle v. Holy
Cross Hospital, and DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications Inc.
1. Guckenberger v. Boston University''
Guckenberger involved a class action brought against Boston Uni-
versity on behalf of the University's learning disabled students."5 2
Specifically, three of the named plaintiffs alleged that the University
had induced them to enroll by promising particular accommodations
for their disabilities. 5 3 The District of Massachusetts held that the
University had made "definite and certain" promises to these three
students that it should have reasonably foreseen would be relied upon
by the students, and that the students did indeed rely on these
from discrete promissory analysis, and advocates jettisoning the doctrine altogether in
favor of a relational approach to the enforcement of such promises. See id. at 307,
310-11; see also Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerg-
ing Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 895, 905 & n.28 (1987)
(identifying factors which courts recognize and account for as barriers to formal con-
tracting despite the promisor's attainment of benefits: (1) the parties' relative status
and knowledge; (2) the existence of a broader relationship between the parties; and
(3) the existence of trust and confidence between the parties). Feinman's relational
approach is a three-step process. See Feinman, Last Article, supra note 21, at 313. The
first step is to identify where a particular transaction lies along a continuum from
discrete transactions to complex relational transactions. See id. The second step is to
determine the applicable norms; different norms will apply to transactions at different
points along the continuum. See id. Step three would require deciding how, if at all,
those norms could be translated into legal rules of contract. See id.
150. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 857. As Eisenberg observed,
"Most commercial promises are either part of an express or implied bargain or in aid
of a bargain, and therefore should be enforceable by expectation damages for much
the same reasons that support expectation damages for explicit bargains." Id.
151. 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997).
152. See id. at 114.
153. See id. at 151-52. The Learning Disabled Support Services ("LDSS") Director
at the University had told one plaintiff that she could substitute another course for
her foreign language requirement. See id. at 151. The University, however, failed to
honor its promise and instead required her to take Swahili. See id. at 152. The Uni-
versity told another plaintiff, who had flown in from California to investigate the
learning-disabled facilities before deciding to attend, that considering his history and
documentation, he would have "no problem" in getting needed exam accommoda-
tions. See id at 151. Instead, he "labored from August until December of his fresh-
man year without LDSS support" and was informed just before fall finals that he had
been denied exam accommodations due to inadequate documentation. See id. at 152.
He suffered stress-related illnesses, fared poorly on his final exams, and lost his schol-
arship. See id at 128. The University sent a letter to a third plaintiff prior to her
matriculation at the law school stating that any evaluation by a professional qualified
to diagnose learning disabilities conducted within the previous three years or while an
undergraduate would suffice to qualify her. See id. at 151-52. When she submitted her
specialist's evaluation in her second year in order to receive exam accommodations,
the University told her that she would have to be completely retested for dyslexia in
the three weeks prior to her exams. See id. at 152.
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promises to their detriment.15 4 The court concluded that the Univer-
sity had breached agreements formed with the students through prom-
issory estoppel.155
The University clearly made its promises with the expectation that
the students would respond by registering at the University. The
promises to two of the three students were given in response to direct
inquiries from those students. 56 The promise to the third student,
however, was contained in a letter mailed to her home prior to matric-
ulation. 5 This could have created questions regarding inducement
and the detrimental nature of her reliance, even though her act of
registering was as concrete and expected as the acts of the other stu-
dents. Nevertheless, although this fact may not demonstrate that she
was actually induced to enroll by the University's promise, neither did
it disprove actual inducement. 5 8
2. Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital' 5 9
In Doyle, a hospital had issued a handbook to its employees in
which it promised to observe certain procedures and safeguards in the
event that it ever needed to lay off any of its employees. 60 Several
154. See id. at 150-52.
155. See id. at 152.
156. See id. at 151-52.
157. See id.
158. It may be that a promise in contemplation of marriage is a clear case, but not
the only case, in which a rescinding promisor "must not insist upon too nice a measure
of proof" of inducement. See De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807, 810 (N.Y. 1917)
("The springs of conduct are subtle and varied. One who meddles with them must not
insist upon too nice a measure of proof that the spring which he released was effective
to the exclusion of all others."); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(2)
(1981) (noting that "[a] charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding
under [promissory estoppel] without proof that the promise induced action or
forbearance").
159. 682 N.E.2d 68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
160. See id. at 69. The handbook containing the Economic Separation Policy was
first issued in 1971. See id. The Economic Separation Policy, policy number 7-G, read
in part:
Holy Cross Hospital is committed to providing a working environment
where employees feel secure in their job. We understand that job security is
important to an employee and to that employee's family. There are in-
stances, though, that for economic or other reasons it becomes apparent that
the permanent elimination of departments, job classifications and/or jobs
must be made, and there is no reasonable expectation that employees af-
fected could be placed in other positions in the hospital or be recalled for
work in one year or less. To ensure that the economic separation is handled
in an objective, structured and consistent way, the following policies will be
followed in determining which employees will be affected.
1. Job Classification
2. Length of Continuous Hospital Service
3. Ability and Fitness to Perform the Required Work
Because of the special needs of our patients, the following factors will be
used in an economic separation affecting R.N.'s:
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years later, the hospital revised its handbook to add a disclaimer that
none of its personnel policies were binding and that employees could
be terminated at any time regardless of notice.161 Several years after
that, the hospital terminated the four plaintiffs. 162 Each plaintiff had
been a nurse at the hospital since the time of the original handbook 16
and was terminated in violation of the promise contained within that
handbook."6
The trial court concluded that the hospital could be released from
its original promise to its employees regarding termination safeguards
and procedures. 65 It observed that in Illinois, both promises and dis-
claimers in an employee handbook are rendered binding by an em-
ployee's continued willingness to work for that employer.16 Thus, the
court ruled that both of the "offers" had been "accepted" by the
nurses' continued employment at the hospital. 67 The court held that
1. Nursing Areas of Expertise
2. Length of Service Within Each Area of Expertise
3. Ability and Fitness to Perform the Required Work.
Employees affected by an economic separation will be placed on a priority
rehire list and will be contacted by the Human Resources Department if a
position becomes available for which the separated employees may be eligi-
ble through experience, training, education and/or other qualifications. Pri-
ority rehire consideration shall be for a period of one year.
Id-
161. See id. The Employment Relationship Policy was added in 1983. See id. That
policy, policy number 5-I, read:
The Personnel Policies and other various Hospital employee and applicant
communications are subject to change from time to time and are not in-
tended to constitute nor do they constitute an implied or express contract or
guarantee of employment for any period of time. The employment relation-
ship between the Hospital and any employee may be terminated at any time
by the Hospital or the employee with or without notice.
Id.
162. See id. at 69. The plaintiffs were all laid off in 1991. See id.
163. See id One nurse was hired in 1960, another in 1968; the remaining two were
both hired in 1972. See id
164. See id. at 69-70. The nurses claimed breach of contract and promissory estop-
pel against the hospital. See id.
165. See id at 70.
166. See id. The rule was stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Duldulao v. St.
Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 505 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 1987). The Duldulao court
held that "an employee handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable con-
tractual rights if the traditional requirements for contract formation are present."
Doyle, 682 N.E.2d at 70 (quoting Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318). The Duldulao court
outlined three elements required for employee handbook provisions to become en-
forceable: (1) a clear promise so that an employee would reasonably believe that an
offer has been made; (2) made "in such a manner that the employee is aware of its
contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer"; (3) which the employee must
accept "by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the [promise]." Id.
(quoting Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318).
167. See Doyle, 682 N.E. 2d at 70. The court followed an earlier appeals court
decision, Condon v. AT & T Co., 569 N.E.2d 518 (IM. App. Ct. 1991), which had
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the first promise was superseded by the second, and it dismissed the
nurses' claims. 68
The Illinois appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and
held the hospital liable for its first promise. 169 It concluded that ex-
tending the Illinois rule to subsequent disclaimers was illogical, be-
cause this would have forced the nurses to quit their jobs in order to
protect their promised employment rights, thereby rendering the first
promise illusory. 7 ° The court held that the first promise was enforce-
able, while the second was not, and it reinstated the nurses' claims. 71
The decision in Doyle offers two interesting insights into the court's
application of promissory estoppel. The first involves the recognized
reliance itself. It may be easier to see the plaintiffs' reliance in Doyle
as definite and substantial than it is to see as concrete. 172 Indeed,
many courts have found that continued employment alone is not suffi-
ciently concrete to constitute reliance at all. 173 Nevertheless, the con-
tinued retention of employees and the benefits that it provides an
employer are normally what employers expect and hope to engender
when making such promises. 174 In that sense, if continued employ-
ment can be termed reliance at all under these circumstances, it is
reliance of a definite and substantial character.
extended the Duldulao rule to a subsequent disclaimer added by an employer. See
Doyle, 682 N.E.2d at 70.
168. See Doyle, 682 N.E.2d at 70. Of course, the nurses could have protested the
new "promise" and could have arguably signaled nonacceptance in other ways than
by quitting. The facts on the record indicated no disapproval by these nurses of the
second promise until the time of the case. This demonstrates that the Illinois rule is
grounded not in bargain theory, but in promissory estoppel. See infra note 176.
169. See Doyle, 682 N.E.2d at 72. The court stated that it "respectfully disagree[d]"
with Condon. Id. at 70.
170. See id. at 72. The court noted that Duldulao had not involved a subsequent
disclaimer. See id. at 71.
171. See id. at 71-72. The court stated that the modification was not bargained for
and was made solely for the benefit of the hospital. See id.
172. See supra note 146.
173. See supra note 146; cf. DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 968 F.
Supp. 963 (D.N.J. 1997) (allowing a claim based upon the refusal of another job offer
in reliance upon a promise of continued employment and job growth, but then doubt-
ing whether the claim would succeed at trial because a severance agreement allevi-
ated the injury). Professor Hillman's survey revealed that employment cases were the
most frequent type of case seeking promissory estoppel-47% of cases over his two
year period-but also one of the least successful, with a 4.23% success rate compared
to an average success rate for all other cases of 14.65%. See Hillman, supra note 22, at
591-94 & tbls. 2.1-2.2.
174. In their article, Farber and Matheson discuss the mutually beneficial work-
place atmosphere engendered by the integrity of promises from employers to employ-
ees. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 145, at 920-24. In return for their promises to
their employees, employers receive benefits in the form of increased loyalty and pro-
ductivity which are not readily quantifiable. See id. at 921, 926. Farber and Matheson
state that courts have increasingly recognized this and, as a result, have begun to
uphold such promises under the promissory estoppel doctrine. See id. at 920-21, 925-
26 (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983)).
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Second, the decision in Doyle underscores the importance of injus-
tice in applying the promissory estoppel doctrine. Doyle involved two
promises, each promulgated in the same fashion, under the same cir-
cumstances, and relied upon in the same way. Nevertheless, the Illi-
nois appellate court enforced one promise while refusing to enforce
the other. 75 An explanation for this decision lies in the fact that any
reliance by the nurses on the second promise was not detrimental to
them, while their reliance on the first promise clearly was. The nurses
could not have possibly relied to their detriment upon a promise
which, by its very existence, was injurious to them. 76 Therefore, the
application of section 90 to the second promise was not required in
order to avoid an injustice.' 77
3. DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications Inc.171
In DeJoy, an employee relied even more concretely upon an em-
ployer's promise than the plaintiffs in Doyle did: he declined another
offer of employment. The case involved a cable television service ex-
ecutive, Frank DeJoy,179 whose company was entering negotiations
for its acquisition by Comcast.1m In anticipation of this takeover,
DeJoy procured a generous severance agreement in the event he was
unjustifiably demoted or terminated.' 8' Additionally, DeJoy later re-
ceived promises of continued employment and job growth with Coin-
cast after the acquisition."s As a result, he declined another
attractive employment offer from a rival cable company. 1s3 After
DeJoy suffered a disability,' s4 Comcast informed him that he was be-
175. See Doyle, 682 N.E.2d at 72.
176. This also illustrates that despite the Illinois precedents' use of the bargain lan-
guage of "offer" and "acceptance," the rule is grounded in promissory estoppel and
injustice. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. Even though the hospital's sec-
ond policy statement may be labeled a promise in a sterile sense of the term, there
still lacked an injustice which would demand enforcement of that "promise." Com-
pare Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1981) (defining promise), with id. § 90
(defining promissory estoppel).
177. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981).
178. 968 F. Supp. 963 (D.NJ. 1997).
179. DeJoy worked for Suburban Cablevision from 1981 to his departure in 1995.
See id. at 969-70.
180. See id. at 970.
181. See id. at 969-70. The severance agreement with Suburban Cablevision would
provide him with a one-time bonus in the event that he was terminated or demoted
other than for just cause within six months after Suburban's sale to Comcast Cable.
See id.
182. See id. at 970-71. The Regional Vice President of Comcast assured DeJoy of
continued employment after the acquisition. See id. He told DeJoy that DeJoy would
be an Area Vice President after the acquisition, and outlined for him a two-year pat-
tern of career growth. See id. at 970.
183. See id. The offer came from the Cablevision corporation. See id.
184. DeJoy suffered an aneurysm, was hospitalized, and went on disability leave.
See id. at 971.
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ing demoted,'85 but he refused to accept the demotion and instead
invoked the severance agreement.18 6
The District of New Jersey refused to grant summary judgment to
Comcast on DeJoy's promissory estoppel claim for continued employ-
ment.' 87 The court ruled that DeJoy had stated a viable claim, which
required, in part, a definite and substantial detriment in reliance upon
a clear promise.' 88 Even though the court doubted whether DeJoy's
claim would ultimately succeed at trial, it nonetheless held that the
claim created a genuine issue of fact for jury consideration.18 9
Like the plaintiffs in Doyle, DeJoy was induced to rely upon an em-
ployer's promise in a definite and substantial way: he chose to remain
in his job. DeJoy's act in reliance, however, was more visible than that
of the Doyle plaintiffs, because DeJoy actually refused another offer
of employment. As such, his is also a stronger case for actual induce-
ment. Nevertheless, even though DeJoy stated all of the components
necessary for a valid claim, the court questioned the likelihood of the
ultimate success of his claim. As the court observed, DeJoy received a
generous severance settlement and also later found another lucrative
position, so his reliance was not likely to have been detrimental to him
at all.' 9° Through this observation, the court revealed its sensitivity to
the overarching issues of injury and injustice, a sensitivity that it pre-
dicted a jury would share.
B. Donative Promises
The few donative promise cases that appeared before courts in 1997
all involved reliance of a definite and substantial nature. The courts
enforced all of these promises. Donative promises represent the cate-
gory of promises that are disputed most by academics' 9' but least by
185. Two months after his aneurysm, Comcast informed him of the demotion to a
position with lesser pay and responsibility than his previous position with Suburban
Cablevision. See id. at 971-72.
186. See id. at 972-73.
187. See id. at 992. The court stated that under New Jersey law, an at-will employee
can use promissory estoppel to recover "losses incident to reliance upon the job offer
itself, even though the employer can terminate the relationship at any time." Id. at
991 (quoting Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 679 A.2d 745, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996),
cert. denied, 686 A.2d 763 (N.J. 1996)).
188. The court stated that in New Jersey, a claim for promissory estoppel requires:
(1) a clear and definite promise by the promisor; (2) made with the expectation that it
will induce reliance by the promisee; (3) upon which the promisee must have reason-
ably relied; (4) resulting in the promisee experiencing a detriment of definite and
substantial nature. See id. at 990.
189. See id. at 992.
190. See id.
191. Professor Eisenberg notes that "donative promises, although at first glance an
inconsequential area of contract law, in fact stand close to its center." Eisenberg,
World of Gift, supra note 12, at 840. This is because the question of their enforcement
"bears directly on one of the deepest social questions of contract law: whether con-
tract law should be based on the deontological objective of ensuring that promisors
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actual litigants. 92 When the Reliance and Promise theorists clash
swords over the proper application of promissory estoppel, the debate
generally centers on donative promises.1 93 Nevertheless, in 1997,
commercial promise cases far outnumbered donative promise cases.19
This section looks at those three cases involving donative promises:
Nappi v. Nappi Distributors, Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mort-
gage Corp., and Thomas v. E.B. Jermyn Lodge No. 2. All three prom-
issory estoppel claims were successful, and this part concludes that all
three promises had been relied upon in definite and substantial ways.
1. Nappi v. Nappi Distributors 95
In Nappi, the founder and president of a beer and wine distributor
company, Nicholas Nappi, had promised the relatives of a friend that
he would pay for an addition to their house.196 The addition was go-
ing to be added in order to accommodate the friend, who had devel-
oped multiple sclerosis.' 97 Nappi's company continued to pay for the
addition after his death.' 98 When the work was completed, the com-
pany sought to subtract those payments from money it had owed to
Nappi's estate.' 99 Nappi's widow objected to the set-off, claiming that
Nappi's promise to pay for the addition did not create a legally bind-
ing obligation on his estate.2° The Maine Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the company had discharged what was indeed an obliga-
tion to pay for the addition on behalf of its founder.01
Nappi clearly induced the relatives to act in definite and substantial
reliance on his promise to pay for the addition. He made the promise
with the clear expectation that they would undertake construction of
an addition as a result of the promise. The relatives expressly testified
keep their promises because it is morally right that promises are kept, or on utilitarian
considerations of facilitating commerce and compensating injured promisees." Id. at
838. Although donative promises have traditionally dominated the academic debate,
a greater number of articles have been written recently that focus on some aspect of
the promissory estoppel enforcement of commercial promises. See, e.g., DeLong,
supra note 147, at 943 (arguing that courts now require a commercial promisee to
show "'enforcement reliance'-reliance on a reasonable belief in the legal enforce-
ability of the promise-in addition to mere 'performance reliance'-reliance on a rea-
sonable belief that the promise will be performed").
192. See supra note 144.
193. See supra Part II.
194. See supra note 144.
195. 691 A.2d 1198 (Me. 1997).
196. See iU. at 1199.
197. See id.
198. See iU.
199. See iL
200. See id.
201. See k at 1200. After quoting section 90 of the Second Restatement, the court
ruled that "[iln the context of the transfer of land, when the donee has made substan-
tial improvements to the land in 'reliance upon the promise to convey the land, courts
will enforce the promise to convey."' Id. (quoting Tozier v. Tozier, 437 A.2d 645, 648
(Me. 1981)).
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that they would not have built the addition but for the promise.2 z As
the court noted, Nappi had been the moving force behind the addi-
tion;20 3 to say he was not obligated to pay as promised would clearly
be unjust to the relatives who had acted in reliance upon that
promise.2°
4
2. Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp. 0 5
In Sutherland, a mortgage company promised one of its mortgagors
that it would allow her to postpone three months of payments on her
mortgage.0 6 The mortgagor's home had been destroyed in an earth-
quake, and she sought the postponement in order to allocate the
money to her extraordinary expenses caused by the earthquake. 0 7
After the company refused to honor its promise and demanded that
she pay for all three months at the end of the third month,0 8 the
mortgagor sought declaratory and injunctive relief against foreclosure
on her home.20 9 The California appellate court reversed the trial
court's summary judgment ruling210 for the mortgage company.2 '
202. See id. at 1199.
203. See supra notes 196-99.
204. The friend and her relatives testified that they had not provided any considera-
tion for the promise, but also testified that the addition would not have been built
otherwise. See Nappi, 691 A.2d at 1199.
205. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Ct. App. 1997).
206. See id. at 617. During the three-month "stop" period, the mortgage company
would expect no mortgage payments, send no notices of delinquency to her, and send
no derogatory information regarding her account to credit agencies. See id.
Despite the commercial relationship between the parties in Sutherland, the promise
between them was arguably donative because it was apparently motivated by benevo-
lence, rather than a desire to obtain economic benefits in return. See supra note 12;
see also Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 823-24 n.14 (including in the world
of gift a charitable pledge that is purportedly made out of generosity and not ex-
pressly conditioned on a reciprocal exchange, despite the potentially self-interested
motives of the pledgor).
207. See Sutherland, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. These included rent on temporary
alternate lodgings. See id.
208. The mortgage company threatened her with foreclosure and unsuccessfully at-
tempted to assign her mortgage to the Federal Housing and Urban Development
Agency. See id. at 617-19.
209. See id. at 617. One issue in the case was whether the mortgage company had
actually fulfilled the promise. See id. at 620-21. The mortgagor believed that the com-
pany, by its promise, agreed to attach the three pay periods onto the end of the life of
the mortgage. See id. at 617. The company argued that it had agreed only to postpone
payments for the three-month period, at the end of which all three payments would
be due in full. See id. at 620. It had acknowledged in a conversation with the mortga-
gor, however, that other earthquake victims in the area had been similarly misguided
due to a lack of clarity on the company's part. See id. at 617-18. The court accepted
the mortgagor's interpretation of the promise, and ruled that the mortgage company
had failed to honor that promise. See id. at 620-21.
210. Professor Hillman considers a promissory estoppel claim to have succeeded on
the merits if the claimant won a judgment on the merits after a trial or after an appeal,
or won a summary judgment motion at any level. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 589.
211. See Sutherland, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622-23, 625.
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The court held that, in these circumstances, promissory estoppel sub-
stituted for consideration and enabled the enforcement of an other-
wise unenforceable gratuitous oral promise to postpone payments
under a written note and deed of trust.
212
Sutherland clearly relied in definite and substantial fashion by allo-
cating her mortgage payments towards her earthquake expenses. She
informed the mortgage company of her circumstances, and the com-
pany's promise was made with the expectation that she would act in
the way that she did. Her reliance directly caused her injury, because
the reallocation of money towards her earthquake expenses left her
unable to meet her mortgage company's demand for payment in
full.213 Therefore, a failure to uphold the promise would have resulted
in injustice to her. 14
3. Thomas v. E.B. Jermyn Lodge No. 2215
Thomas involved a fraternal lodge that had promised to pay the
legal fees of William Thomas, a member of the lodge facing criminal
charges.2 16 Thomas acted on the promise by hiring a lawyer, a step he
would have otherwise been financially unable to take.217 The lodge
subsequently refused to honor its promise, determining that Thomas
had not followed proper lodge procedure for making such requests.21 8
212. See id at 622. The court noted that promissory estoppel binds a promisor to
his promise "when he should reasonably expect a substantial change of position,
either by act or forbearance, in reliance on his promise, if injustice can be avoided
only by its enforcement." Id (quoting Raedeke v. Gibraltar Say. & Loan Ass'n, 517
P.2d 1157, 1161 n.1 (1974)).
213. The court expressly found that she had relied to her detriment. See id. at 622.
214. Although the company did not argue that Sutherland would have been unable
to pay anyway, the court ruled that she had relied to her detriment after first noting
that promissory estoppel requires a "substantial change in position." Id. (quoting
Raedeke, 517 P.2d at 1161 n.1). Yorio and Thel have argued that the enforcement of
promises to pay insurance premiums for people who apparently could not themselves
pay the premiums indicates that actual reliance is not needed. See Yorio & Thel, supra
note 3, at 155-56. To this, Hillman responds:
[Yorio and Thel] assert that the promisee could not have relied on the prom-
ise because the promisee could not pay. However, most of the cases do not
focus on why the promisee could not pay or whether the promisee could
have borrowed or raised money if necessary. A fair hypothesis may be that
the insured would have pursued those possibilities but for the promise.
Hillman, supra note 22, at 613-14.
215. 693 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
216. See id. at 976. He was charged with improperly distributing civil service test
answers to Scranton police officers. See id.
217. See id. at 978. Thomas testified that he borrowed money from his mother to
pay the legal fees on the express promise that the lodge would repay him. See id. &
n.5.
218. See id. at 977. Thomas met with the Lodge's board of directors to request the
assistance, various boardmembers questioned him about his legal representation, and
the minutes of that board meeting were presented to the general members in their
regularly scheduled meeting before granting Thomas's request. See id. The lodge's
by-laws, however, required that a special members' meeting approve any requests for
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The lodge appealed from a jury verdict for Thomas, arguing that the
evidence did not support application of promissory estoppel because
Thomas had not detrimentally relied upon the promise to pay the
legal fees.219 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, affirming
the trial court's denial of the lodge's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.22 °
Thomas's retention of private legal counsel undoubtedly constituted
reliance of a definite and substantial character. The lodge made its
promise with the expectation that Thomas would hire his own attor-
ney, the act that Thomas did indeed perform. Thomas was unable to
pay for a private lawyer on his own, but hired one in reliance upon the
lodge's promise to reimburse him. Therefore, the court properly held
that he had detrimentally relied on the promise, and it dismissed the
lodge's claim that specifically disputed that fact. 2
All three donative promises that courts enforced in 1997 featured
reliance of a definite and substantial character. In addition, all three
promises prompted acts in reliance that were found to be detrimental
to the promisees. Significantly, no other donative promises appeared
before courts in 1997. This indicates the importance of injury and in-
justice in causing promisees to litigate, and courts to enforce, donative
promises. Part IV discusses this importance and, more specifically,
evaluates the role of an act in reliance that is not only definite and
substantial but also detrimental to promisees in creating injustice that
prompts promisees and courts to take action.
IV. DONATIVE PROMISES AND INJUSTICE
The pecuniary and emotional costs of litigation, along with the un-
derstanding that donative promises are of uncertain reliability, likely
deter promisees from seeking judicial enforcement of these promises.
An injury caused by definite and substantial reliance upon a donative
promise, however, gives rise to injustice for which promisees are will-
ing to seek legal remedies and to which courts are willing to apply
promissory estoppel. As a result, while few donative promises ap-
peared before courts in 1997, all of them caused definite and substan-
tial reliance on those promises.222 Courts are similarly willing to
overcome their own reluctance to enforce nonbargain promises when
such reliance exists.223 This part argues that the recurring presence of
definite and substantial reliance merits its recognition as an essential
legal assistance. See id. The board had not informed Thomas of this requirement. See
id. Thomas believed that he pursued his request normally; he had previously secured
assistance with legal expenses in the same fashion in 1983. See id.
219. See id. at 978.
220. See id. at 976-80.
221. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part III.B.
223. See infra Part IV.B.
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component of promissory estoppel and ultimately reflects Professor
Williston's promise-based conception of the doctrine.
A. Promisees
For the most part, donative promisees are not likely to contemplate
legal action when the promises go unfulfilled. Because of the familiar
relationships within which most donative promises are made, weighty
emotional and financial costs generally deter litigation. The Reliance
position, therefore, argues against the general enforceability of simple
donative promises.' They reason that such a rule would not only fail
to recognize that promisees often have a moral obligation to release
promisors from these promises, but would also undermine the benev-
olent motives behind such promises and impoverish their emotional
context.22 The donative promisees involved in these relationships
about which the Reliance theorists opine are likely to sense these con-
siderations as acutely as those commentators. 6
In addition, the uncertainty surrounding mere promises to give gifts
reduces the likelihood that a promisee will actually rely upon such a
promise, or seek legal enforcement if she has so relied. By promising
to give a gift rather than actually giving it,27 a donative promisor re-
tains the ability to rescind upon a change of heart.' As a result, don-
224. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 846-49; supra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text.
225. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 846-49; supra notes 6466 and
accompanying text.
226. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 847. Eisenberg has observed
that:
[T]he world of contract is a market world, largely driven by relatively imper-
sonal considerations and focussed on commodities and prices. The imper-
sonal organs of the state are an appropriate means to enforce promises made
in such a world. In contrast, much of the world of gift is driven by affective
considerations like love, affection, friendship, gratitude, and comradeship.
That world would be impoverished if it were to be collapsed into the world
of contract.
Id. The prospect of such impoverishment would no doubt give pause to the donative
promisee. Andrew Kull opined that it would be "unthinkable" for Nephew to sue
Uncle after Uncle broke his promise. See Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous
Promises, 21 J. Legal Stud. 39, 61-64 (1992).
227. Completed gifts are irrevocable. See Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Per-
sonal Property § 7.1 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975); Eisenberg, World of
Gift, supra note 12, at 824 ("[Tjhe common law draws exceptionally sharp distinctions
between gifts and promises to make gifts: Gifts are irrevocable; promises to make
gifts are unenforceable.").
228. The donative promisor can only retain this right, of course, in the absence of a
certain reliance. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981). Lying be-
neath Eisenberg's donative promise principle is the process-related rationale that "the
potential for untrustworthy behavior is sufficiently large that making simple donative
promises enforceable would lead to trouble." Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12,
at 851-52 n.74; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises to Make Gifts, 43 Am. J. Comp.
L. 359, 361 n.8 (1995) (noting three reasons why a donor might promise to give rather
than actually give: (1) a lack of available funds; (2) a desire to earn a higher rate of
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ative promises tend to arouse only hope within the promisees, rather
than anticipation or reliance.229 A promisee who relies upon such a
promise, therefore, is vulnerable to the perception that she has acted
carelessly,23° or may even feel that she has gambled and lost.231 As a
result, promisees may tend not to act in reliance at all,232 or upon
doing so, to direct their disappointment inwardly rather than at the
rescinding promisors.
A promisee who has relied in a definite and substantial manner,
however, is more likely to feel justified in her act, and thus more will-
ing to pursue legal alternatives, when the promise upon which she so
specifically relied is broken. A promisor who makes a promise ex-
pecting to induce a particular act manifests a higher level of commit-
ment to the promisee and an understanding that the expected act will
not go unrecognized.233 A promisee is therefore likely to feel more
secure in performing the expected act.234 The promisee who suffers a
substantial injury when such a promise is broken is more likely to feel
return or gain a tax advantage; or (3) a desire to allow for contingencies that may
cause a change of mind); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises:
An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261, 1271-74 (1980) (arguing
for non-enforcement of simple donative promises in part because reflection upon lost
opportunities often causes a promisor to regret her promise, and because donative
promises would be too cumbersome if they had to be conditioned upon the nonoccur-
rence of potential regrets).
229. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 3 ("[T]he psychological
state aroused by a donative promise is often closer to hope than to anticipation."). As
a result, Eisenberg notes that "'[s]eeing is believing' might well be the motto of dona-
tive promisees." Id. (footnote omitted). Eisenberg further notes that "the low inten-
sity of [promisees'] expectations principally derives from their understanding that
such promises are often not kept and that legal enforcement-whether or not avail-
able-is financially and emotionally impracticable." Id. at 3 n.7; see also supra note 66
(discussing reasons for a donative promisee's lack of expectation).
230. In addition, a disappointed promisee may not have the heart to seek enforce-
ment. Eisenberg has noted that because a promised gift is an expression of affection,
when that affection is withdrawn, the promised gift becomes empty. See Eisenberg,
World of Gift, supra note 12, at 848. The promisee may not desire fulfillment of a
promise that is now essentially valueless to him, even despite his own loss in reliance.
231. See DeLong, supra note 147, at 953. Professor DeLong, discussing commercial
promises, notes:
In the paradigmatic case, the promisee will be better off if she relies and the
promise is performed, and worse off if she relies and the promise is
breached, than she would be if she did not rely at all. Given the uncertainty
about whether the promise will be performed, therefore, a promisee who
relies on a promise takes a risk in order to obtain a benefit.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
232. As Eisenberg observes, "One reason that donative promises often fail to
arouse a secure expectation is that the promisee realizes the promisor may back off
when a sober self returns." Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 5.
233. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 163 ("The promisor's contemplation of par-
ticular and substantial reliance is important ... because it signals the quality of her
commitment.").
234. See id.
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like a victim of an injustice2 5 and thus more willing to seek legal
means of enforcement.236 As a result, the donative promise cases that
do appear before courts are likely to feature detrimental reliance of a
definite and substantial character.
B. Courts
Promises that induce promisees to rely detrimentally in definite and
substantial ways give rise to an injustice to which courts respond de-
spite the absence of consideration.3 7 Courts are generally reluctant
to enforce promises that are not supported by consideration. 38 In-
deed, section 90 has largely failed to transform promise enforcement
towards reliance in the way some commentators once thought possi-
ble.3 9 Courts are responsive, however, to injury and injustice.2 14
235. Reliance commentators also acknowledge a nexus between foreseeability and
justice. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 611. Hillman states that "the justice of compen-
sating a party for induced detrimental reliance is an important factor in the deci-
sions," and later, that "[t]he requirement of foreseeability seems a reasonable manner
of determining when detrimental reliance should be compensated." Id. at 615.
236. Eisenberg writes that uncompensated reasonable reliance begins to move a
promise out of the donative realm and into "the hard-headed world of contract"
where legal enforcement is routine. See Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at
824-25, 850. Such an effect, then, could only be increased as the act in reliance be-
comes more substantial and more definite. See id.
Thus, in the introductory hypothetical, Nephew is more likely to rely upon Uncle's
promise by buying a car than by buying the ticket to Las Vegas. He is also more likely
in the first scenario to bring his Uncle to court over the broken promise.
237. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 14, at 3 ("IT]he state (speaking
through the courts) may fairly take the position that its compulsory processes will not
be made available to redress every hurt, but only to remedy injuries that reach a
certain intensity .. ").
238. Professor Hillman's statistics indicate that reported promissory estoppel
claims are seldom victorious. See Hillman, supra note 22, at 580; see also Response
Oncology, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 941 S.W.2d 771,778 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding a promissory estoppel claim by a cancer treatment center against a health
insurance company but noting that "[elstoppel is not a favorite of the law"); Virginia
Sch. of the Arts, Inc. v. Eichelbaum, 493 S.E.2d 510, 512 (Va. 1997) (holding that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be adopted in Virginia).
239. Some writers have recently argued that the application and use of promissory
estoppel has experienced significant decline. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 22, at 618-
19 (stating that despite predictions that it would "'swallow up' bargain theory...
promissory estoppel may no longer be, if it ever was, a significant theory of recov-
ery"); Pham, supra note 16, at 1263-64 (noting that "courts, rather than enthusiasti-
cally embracing promissory estoppel theory, in fact severely limit its application").
For a prediction that promise enforcement would be "swallowed up" by the reliance
principle, see generally Gilmore, supra note 28.
240. See supra Part HI.B; see also Cole v. Knoll, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1117, 1133 (W.D.
Mich. 1997) ("[T]he doctrine of estoppel should be applied 'only where the facts are
unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted."' (quoting Barber v. SMH
(US), Inc., 509 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993))); Cossack v. Bums, 970 F.
Supp. 108, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]o sustain a claim for promissory estoppel under
New York law, a plaintiff must also show that he 'suffered unconscionable injury.'");
Hillman, supra note 22, at 609-10 (stating that courts' perceptions of injustice govern
awards of damages); supra note 143 and accompanying text (citing cases that explic-
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Therefore, courts use section 90 to enforce donative promises when
non-enforcement would result in injustice due to detrimental reliance
of a definite and substantial nature.2 4'
The existence of detrimental reliance in the 1997 cases, as well as
reliance of definite and substantial character, persuasively suggests
that both are required elements under section 90. Every donative
promise that appeared in 1997 was relied upon in a definite and sub-
stantial way, clearly rendering unjust the promisor's failure to honor
the promise.242 The courts also specifically found that the promisees'
reliance had been detrimental in every case2 43 -in one case, the court
found so in response to a direct challenge to that fact on appeal by the
244promisor. One can argue that a court might still enforce a donative
promise in the absence of either of the two elements. Nevertheless,
the existence of both as clear components in every case more likely
accords with Williston's observation and belief that both reliance of a
definite and substantial character and actual inducement are indeed
necessary for enforcement.245
Section 90 should reflect this central role of both definite and sub-
stantial reliance and inducement in actual cases involving donative
itly seek detrimental reliance); cf. Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 114 ("[C]ourts re-
spond to an impulse to enforce serious promises.").
This may also explain why Williston included the expectation of definite and sub-
stantial reliance, occurrence of the act itself, and inducement as requirements for the
application of promissory estoppel. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 123. The Prom-
ise theorists now question the requirement for actual inducement. See supra Part
II.B.2.
241. See, e.g., West Cent. Mo. Reg'l Lodge No. 50 v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 939
S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("The essential elements of a promissory estop-
pel claim are (1) a promise; (2) detrimental reliance on the promise; (3) the promisor
should have or did in fact clearly foresee the precise action which the promisee took
in reliance; and (4) injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise."
(citing Townes v. Jerome L. Howe, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)));
see also supra Part III (discussing the 1997 promissory estoppel cases). This highlights
the importance of the final clause in section 90(1): "A promise ... is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 90(1) (1981). As Professor Corbin noted:
[I]f all the other requirements of the stated rule are satisfied, does not justice
always require enforcement of the promise? So far as the Restatement itself
informs us, the answer is Yes. [But this clause] remind[s] the court that this
particular rule cannot be applied by a mechanical process. Indeed, by its
very existence, the clause is a suggestion that sometimes the answer should
be No.
Corbin. supra note 4, § 200.
242. See supra Part III.
243. See supra Part III.
244. See Thomas v. E.B. Jermyn Lodge No. 2, 693 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
245. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 123.
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promises.' 4 For fifty years, the Restatement purported to be an accu-
rate distillation of prevailing contract principles. 47 Consequently,
many courts have adopted it as the law in their jurisdictions. 48 Be-
cause of this deference with which courts view the Restatement, it
should aspire to be just that: an accurate statement of the law.
C. Injustice
The existence of both reliance of a definite and substantial charac-
ter and injury as necessary components to the injustice inquiry indi-
cates a promise-based conception of promissory estoppel. Indeed, the
final analysis is whether the avoidance of injustice requires the appli-
cation of promissory estoppel.24 9 As indicated by the cases, injury is
essential to injustice, for without an injury, injustice cannot exist.250
As Promise theorists have observed, there can exist no injury without
inducement.5 A moral failure to honor one's promise may result in
an injury to oneself or perhaps to society as a whole, - but it is not the
type of injury for which civil contract law seeks to provide a rem-
edy. 3 Reliance theorists are therefore correct to insist upon the im-
portance of actual reliance in the application of the doctrine.5'
Nevertheless, the 1997 cases also indicate that definite and substan-
tial reliance is an equally necessary component to the injustice which
promissory estoppel seeks to avoid." 5 In each donative case, the
promisee's injury resulted from an act in reliance that was not only
substantial, but also definite according to the expectation of the prom-
isor.256 This indicates a conception of the doctrine that is grounded in
the promise, for it is the promise which not only prompts but also
246. As was the case in the First Restatement. See Restatement of Contracts § 90
(1932).
247. See supra notes 39, 56 and accompanying text; see also Restatement of Con-
tracts at xi (1932) ("The function of the Institute is to state clearly and precisely in the
light of the decisions the principles and rules of the common law.").
248. See supra notes 38-41, 55-56 and accompanying text.
249. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981).
250. See supra Part III.
251. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 159-60; supra Part II.B.2.
252. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 3, at 121.
253. Eisenberg states that "it is fair to say that American contract law.... tends to
focus on compensating injured promisees and facilitating commerce rather than on
promise-keeping as an end in itself." Eisenberg, World of Gift, supra note 12, at 839;
see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (noting that not all promises are
enforceable); cf. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L Rev. 553, 579
(1933) ("Contractual obligation is not coextensive with injurious reliance because (1)
there are instances of both injury and reliance for which there is no contractual obli-
gation, and (2) there are cases of such obligation where there is no reliance or
injury.").
254. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 22, at 580-81 (stressing the importance of actual
reliance to promissory estoppel enforcement).
255. See supra Part II.B.
256. See supra Parts II.B, IV.B.
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defines the injustice to be avoided.257 The injustice ultimately arises
from an injury that exists not simply because a promisee has reason-
ably relied, but because a promisor has refused to keep her promise
despite causing the very act that she had anticipated causing.
This conception of the promissory estoppel doctrine fully accords
with neither the Reliance view nor the Promise view of the doctrine.
It does not completely coincide with the Reliance view25 8 because the
injustice to which courts and litigants respond does not simply result
from uncompensated reasonable reliance. Nor does it fully accord
with the Promise view2 59 because the injury does not result merely
from the breaking of a serious and deliberate promise. Instead, the
injustice results from the promisor's failure to honor the promise with
which she induced the very act in reliance that she had anticipated
causing.
This injustice to which courts and litigants respond accords with
Williston's view of promissory estoppel, the view that he derived from
the cases and set forth in the First Restatement.26 ° Williston's view,
which resulted from his aim to state the law as it then existed,26 re-
quired both definite and substantial reliance and the inducement of
the promisee.262 The 1997 donative cases indicate that these are still
essential components to promissory estoppel's application and use.2 6 3
While the Second Restatement explicitly recognizes the inducement
component as essential, it does not similarly recognize the definite and
substantial component.26" Although one might argue that the Second
Restatement implicitly requires that character of reliance, one could
not do so without conceding that the First Restatement surpasses the
Second in clarity.
CONCLUSION
Reliance of a definite and substantial character is routinely present
in recent cases to which promissory estoppel was applied. This recur-
ring presence indicates that this type of reliance is a necessary compo-
nent in determining whether a promise must be enforced to avoid an
injustice. Its coexistence with actual injury therefore reflects Profes-
sor Williston's original promise-based conception of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, the view that he derived from the cases and en-
capsulated in section 90 of the First Restatement. Although the Sec-
257. See supra Part II.A-B.
258. See supra Part II.A-B.
259. See supra Part II.A-B.
260. See Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932); see also Yorio & Thel, supra note 3,
at 123 (noting that Williston required induced reliance of a definite and substantial
character); supra notes 31, 119 and accompanying text (same).
261. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 260.
263. See supra Parts III.B, IV.B.
264. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981).
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ond Restatement might state the promissory estoppel doctrine as
some believe it should be, the First Restatement continues to state
that doctrine as it currently exists. Judges do believe that the Restate-
ment states the law as it is; therefore, the Institute's higher goal in
framing the Restatement should be accuracy rather than aspiration.
Notes & Observations
